INTRODUCTION
It is remarkably difficult to describe any aspect of Gottfried Leibniz's metaphysical system in a way that is completely uncontroversial. Interpreters disagree widely, even about the most basic Leibnizian doctrines. One reason for these disagreements is the fact that Leibniz characterizes central elements of his system in multiple different ways, often without telling us how to reconcile these different accounts. Leibniz's descriptions of the most fundamental entities in his ontology are a case in point, and they will be the focus of this paper. Even if we look only at texts from the monadological or mature period-that is, the period starting in the mid-1690s-we find Leibniz portraying the inhabitants of the metaphysical ground floor in at least three different ways. In some places, he describes them as mind-like, immaterial substances that perceive and strive, or possess perceptions and appetitions-analogous in many ways to Cartesian souls. Elsewhere, he presents them as hylomorphic compounds, each consisting of primary matter and a substantial form. In yet other passages, he characterizes them in terms of primitive and derivative forces. Are these three accounts merely different ways of describing the same underlying reality? Since Leibniz sometimes uses all three descriptions in the same text, 1 he appears to have thought so. But it is not obvious how exactly this is supposed to work. There is no consensus on how to reconcile Leibniz's different descriptions of the most fundamental entities in his system. Perhaps the most straightforward suggestion is that the first description is the most accurate: simple substances or monads are mind-like, immaterial substances that possess appetitions and perceptions. On that interpretation, Leibniz's ontology is best understood as a quasi-Cartesian substance-mode ontology. Leibniz departs from Cartesianism mainly in claiming that all substances are mind-like and that being mindlike does not require consciousness. If this interpretation is correct, Leibniz's description of monads in terms of primitive and derivative forces can be explained by pointing out that monads possess forces or active powers. In fact, Leibniz appears to hold that possessing active powers is a necessary condition for substancehood. 2 The centrality of powers in his theory of substance might explain why he sometimes describes monads just in terms of powers, without mentioning that these powers are properties of mind-like substances.
Moreover, we might be able to explain Leibniz's use of hylomorphic terminology by pointing to the way in which what he calls the 'law of the series' of a substance mirrors some of the most central functions of substantial forms. Among other things, this law unifies the substance synchronically and diachronically, in addition to specifying the properties and activities that are characteristic of that substance.
This paper aims to throw a wrench into the interpretation just sketched. That wrench is a thorough and systematic examination of the ontology of Leibnizian forces as well as their relationship to monads. I will provide evidence that Leibniz's monadological metaphysics is even more radical than it initially seems: his ontology is best understood not as a substancemode ontology but as a force ontology. 3 At the metaphysical ground floor, we do not find substances that possess force; instead, we just find forces. Indeed, each unified force constitutes what Leibniz calls a 'monad' or 'substance.' This, at the very least, is a strand in Leibniz's mature philosophy-and, I will argue, a prominent strand. In fact, central
Leibnizian commitments push him toward a force ontology.
Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist also opens the door for a new reconciliation 2 See e.g. letter to de Volder, April 3, 1699, LDV 73; ONI 15 . 3 Maybe we could even call it 'process ontology,' as Nicholas Rescher does (2007) . Yet, I prefer calling it 'force ontology' because Leibniz describes his ontology in terms of forces or powers, instead of processes. In fact, insofar as processes are temporally extended, Leibniz would presumably view processes as grounded in forces and thus less fundamental than forces.
the bottom level of Leibniz's system. In fact, we will see that it makes good sense for Leibniz to describe the fundamental forces in these different ways-not just pragmatically, or to make his ontology seem less radical to his readers, but also philosophically. When he describes the fundamental entities as akin to Cartesian souls or hylomorphic compounds, he is not misdescribing them; rather, he is bringing out crucial features of his force ontology. I will show that for Leibniz, force plays the role of matter and form as well as the role of substances and their states.
The interpretation of Leibniz's mature ontology that I will put forward is quite different from some of the interpretations that are currently most influential in the English-speaking world. For instance, it directly contradicts Daniel Garber's account of how forces figure into
Leibniz's monadological metaphysics. This becomes clear in the following passage from
Garber's monograph Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad:
the primitive active and passive forces, the form and matter that in the earlier view have a fundamental metaphysical status, are, in the monadological view, understood as features of the perceptions of these monads. … In this way the notion of force, which seemed to be at the root of Leibniz's metaphysics in the earlier texts … loses its foundational status: primitive force gets folded into the perceptual life of nonextended perceiving things. (2009: 319) According to Garber, forces are not fundamental entities in Leibniz's mature ontology; he interprets Leibniz as a straightforward substance-mode ontologist. Several other interpreters appear to agree. 4 In contrast, some Leibniz scholars take the hylomorphic description to be most accurate.
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There are other interpreters who acknowledge that Leibniz's ontology bottoms out in forces; I am not the first person to suggest this. A particularly explicit endorsement of this type of interpretation can be found in Martha Bolton and John Whipple (Bolton 2008: 119f.; Whipple 2010: 393) . 6 Moreover, Robert Adams claims in at least one place that primitive forces are the most fundamental items in Leibniz's ontology (1994: 265) . Yet, these other scholars who attribute a force ontology to Leibniz mention it only in passing. None of them, as far as I am aware, explore in detail what precisely the fundamentality of forces means for Leibniz's metaphysics or how it fits together with Leibniz's other claims about monads.
These are the tasks that I aim to tackle in this paper. My discussion will show that interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences: it requires us to reevaluate many other aspects of his monadology. For instance, it forces us to reconsider the status of perceptions and appetitions as well as the status of time.
The claim that forces are the sole occupants of the metaphysical ground floor of Leibniz's mature system may strike some readers as a non-starter. Antecedently, one might expect Leibniz to view forces as the properties of substances rather than what constitutes substances. In fact, it may seem that Leibniz needs a substratum of some kind-either a bare substratum or something more robust-in order to maintain the unity of substances.
Without a substratum, the worry goes, monads would be like heaps or loose bundles of forces-an unacceptable consequence for Leibniz, who is particularly adamant that substancehood requires a robust type of unity. Yet, I will argue that Leibniz does not hold that substances derive their unity from a substratum that is not force-like. Instead, they derive their unity from a primitive-that is, fundamental or foundational-force.
FORCE AND POWER
Without further ado, let us explore Leibniz's discussions of the nature and ontological status of forces. Or, rather, with one further ado: it will help to start with a brief overview of the terminology that Leibniz uses to describe forces. This important task is difficult because-like so often-Leibniz uses many different terms without always making clear whether they are synonymous. He appears to use some of them synonymously in certain places but not in others. And, to make matters even more complicated, Leibniz acknowledges different types of forces. We will need to sort out some of those terminological and classificatory issues before looking more directly into the ontology of Leibnizian forces. In fact, this brings me to an important caveat: forces also play an important role in Leibniz's physics but I will bracket those types of forces as far as possible.
Instead, I will concentrate on the status of forces at the most fundamental metaphysical level. Several passages reveal that Leibniz's primitive passive power is analogous to some Scholastic conceptions of primary matter in at least two crucial ways: (i) it is the passive constituent of substances, and (ii) it does not possess any actuality independently of the active constituent of substances. 15 In some texts, Leibniz adds a third characteristic that primitive passive power shares with Scholastic primary matter: (iii) it is that which makes the substance a material thing with physical properties, such as impenetrability and resistance. 16 We will see later that once we dig deeper into (ii), the similarity is not extremely profound.
Leibniz understands primitive passive power as lacking actuality in a more radical sense than his Scholastic predecessors. The same applies to (i) and (iii): Leibniz's understanding of the passive constituent of substances and the status of material things departs in fundamental ways from traditional versions of hylomorphism. Nevertheless, these analogies can help explain why Leibniz so often describes his ontology in hylomorphic terminology; they do point to genuine (albeit imperfect) similarities.
To see that Leibniz views primitive passive power as the passive constituent of substances and as that which gives the substance physical properties, the following letter to Isaac Jaquelot is helpful:
In all corporeal substances I recognize two primitive powers, namely entelechy or primitive active power, which is the soul in animals and mind in man, and which in general is the substantial form of the ancients; and also prime matter, or primitive passive power, which produces resistance. So properly speaking it is the entelechy which acts, and matter which is acted on 19 See e.g. a letter to Rudolph Christian Wagner: "God alone is a substance truly separated from matter, since he is actus purus, endowed with no passive power, which, wherever it is, constitutes matter" (June 4, 1710, G 7:530/W 506). 20 One helpful passage is from the draft of a letter to de Volder: "the primitive or derivative force that is conceived of in extension and bulk is not a thing outside perceivers but a phenomenon. … That which results from the passions of the perceivers … gives rise to the apparition of bulk, i.e., of the passive force of bodies. … [Y]ou will easily see from this that material substances are not destroyed but conserved, provided that they are sought in dynamism, … i.e., in the active and passive force of perceivers, not outside of them" (January 1706, LDV 337f.). See also an earlier letter to de Volder: "matter is real to the extent that there is a reason in the simple substance for the passivity that is observed in the phenomena" (January 1705, LDV 321).
Leibniz sometimes calls 'corporeal substances.' 21 Fully examining the relation between the metaphysical and the physical level would take us too far afield.
Before examining the ontological status of primitive passive power and its relation to active power in more depth, it is worth pausing to note an implication of what we have seen so far. By identifying primary matter with primitive passive power and substantial forms with primitive active power, Leibniz appears to be endorsing an ontology in which forces or powers are the most fundamental entities. Substances consist of passive and active powers, and nothing else. This is the first indication that Leibniz's ontology is a force ontology: at the metaphysical ground floor, we find only forces. In many ways, this is a radical move. Yet, it can be seen as a natural extension of traditional versions of hylomorphism. After all, some
Scholastics describe primary matter as pure potentiality-that is, as passive power.
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Moreover, we will see later that it makes at least some sense to understand Scholastic substantial forms as active powers for particular kinds of activities. In this respect, Leibniz's ontology is simply hylomorphism with a twist-though the twist arguably takes Leibniz outside of the realm of hylomorphism.
Despite the similarities between primitive passive power and Scholastic primary matter that we noted earlier, there is one way in which they appear to be quite different. It seems that Leibniz, unlike many Scholastics, does not view primitive passive power as the ultimate substratum of change or the fundamental subject of inherence. 23 Instead, it appears to be a mere privation or limitation of primitive active force. 24 Let us call this 'the limitation reading.'
If the limitation reading is correct, Leibniz is departing quite radically from hylomorphism:
substances ultimately possess not two constituents, but only one. This means that his mature ontology is not genuinely hylomorphic. On what I take to be the most straightforward reading of this letter, Leibniz is claiming that if something is perfect, it lacks passivity, and if something is not perfect, it possesses passivity. In other words, imperfection is a necessary and sufficient condition for passivity.
Combined with the evidence from the letter to Morell, this indicates that passivity just is imperfection or limitation.
There are also passages that provide more overt support for the limitation reading by directly associating primary matter with limitations or privations. One of these passages is from Leibniz's notes on William Twisse, which he appears to have composed in 1695. There, when discussing the way in which created things are represented in the divine intellect, We could hardly have asked for more direct evidence in favor of the limitation reading.
Leibniz states plainly that matter and passivity are mere privations, imperfections, or limitations; they are nothings. What is real in a creature is activity or the power of action; this positive constituent is limited, which means that there is passivity, but this passivity is merely "the denial of further progress."
Next, let us briefly turn to derivative passive powers. As we saw earlier, Leibniz associates them with secondary matter-that is, with mass or, according to one text, "matter as it actually occurs, invested with its derivative qualities" (NE 222 In other words, the difference between simple faculties and forces proper is that the former require an external stimulus in order to manifest, while the latter manifest without a stimulus. He associates the simple faculties or bare possibilities with Scholastic philosophy in a few other texts as well, and he contrasts that understanding with his own account, according to which no external stimulus is needed. shorthand for talking about the substance's action, it may become problematic to talk of one faculty being moved by another. What activates a power of the soul would, ultimately, be the soul itself; the soul would be moving itself from potency to act. In effect, that would mean that the soul has the power to act without a stimulus.
Another possible reason why Leibniz denies the need for stimuli is his concern about intelligibility: invoking merely a "near possibility," as he thinks the Scholastics do, does not genuinely explain change. As he puts it in one of the texts in which he contrasts his own understanding of force with Scholastic powers: "Possibility alone produces nothing, unless it is put into action; but force produces everything" (Reply Unfortunately, Leibniz does not appear to tell us explicitly why he thinks that Scholastic powers are unintelligible while his own are intelligible. Some amount of speculation seems necessary here. Perhaps his worry about Scholastic powers is the following: saying that x had the power to φ in the Scholastic sense does not fully explain why it φ-ed. Instead, we additionally need to invoke some other thing that caused or stimulated x to φ. In fact, a regress appears to be looming here: the thing that stimulated x to φ presumably must have had the power to stimulate x. Why did it exercise this power? We need to invoke another thing that stimulated it, and so on. This might be problematic even if the stimulation comes from inside the substance at every step. If this is correct, Leibniz may have thought that in order for forces to genuinely explain change, they must lead to an action without a stimulus.
We have arrived, then, at a rough preliminary understanding of Leibnizian active forces:
they are entities that lead to a change unless there is an impediment. Leibniz himself puts it this way in a French letter to Jacques Lelong: "By the Force that I bestow on substances, I
individual substance" (ONI 9). Bobro and Clatterbaugh argue for this interpretation at length (1996: 416, see also 38 See also a reply to Bayle, where he says that by 'forces,' he means "the source of modifications within a created thing, or a state of that thing from which it can be seen that there will be a change of modifications" (G 4:568/PT 252). 39 An almost identical definition occurs in one of Leibniz's tables of definitions from the mature period (C 474); see also a letter to de Volder, April 3, 1699, LDV 73. For another French definition of 'force' along similar lines, see a letter to Remond, November 4, 1715, G 3:657. 40 See also a letter to Remond, November 4, 1715: "the entelechy of Aristotle … is nothing but force or activity" (G 3:657/W 554).
Hence, Leibniz wants force to play a role analogous to that of Aristotelian entelechies and substantial forms.
As already seen, Leibniz sometimes ascribes the role of substantial forms to active forces and the role of primary matter to passive forces. Together, these two types of forces constitute a complete substance. Hence, it makes sense that Leibniz occasionally identifies substances with passive and active forces. For example, Leibniz says in 'On Nature Itself'
that "the very substance of things consists in a force for acting and being acted upon" (ONI §8). 41 Similarly, in a text from the mid-1690s, Leibniz writes that "since everything that can be understood in substances reduces to their actions and passions, and to the dispositions that they have for that effect, I do not see that it is possible to find in substances anything more basic [primitif] than the principle of all of that-that is, than force" (reply to Objections It is interesting to note that in some ways, Leibniz's claim that substantial forms are simply powers is in the spirit of medieval Aristotelianism. For many Aristotelians, having a substantial form principally means having a particular set of powers or potentialities.
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Further, these Aristotelians explain the typical activities of a substance by reference to those powers. The following passage from Aquinas's Summa Theologiae captures this nicely: "from the form follows an inclination to an end, or to an action, or to something of this kind. For any thing, insofar as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is suitable for it, in accordance with its form" (I qu. 5 art. 5, corp.). For instance, possessing the substantial form of a human being means, in part, possessing the power for rational thought; possessing the substantial form of fire means, in part, possessing the power to ignite things and to move upward. 47 Leibniz agrees: like medieval Aristotelians, he thinks that each substance has an essence or nature that specifies the ways in which that substance is naturally inclined or disposed to act; essences come with potentialities for action. Leibnizian primitive forces are of course far more specific than the substantial forms described by traditional Aristotelians: a primitive force specifies everything that will ever happen in the substance. Yet, in a way, his account is simply an extension of the Scholastic account.
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45 See also a draft of 'New System,' where Leibniz says that force is that which "constitutes substance" (comme le constitutive de la substance; G 4:472/WF 22), as well as a letter to Jaquelot: "God gave the soul the power of producing its own thoughts. … Indeed, according to me, the nature of each substance consists in this force" (February 9, 1704, G 3:464/WF 175) . 46 To be sure, Aristotelians do not typically appear to identify substantial forms with powers. Yet, according to Dennis Des Chene, "the only 'analysis' [of substantial forms] Aristotelianism was willing to provide was to describe the active powers associated with a form and the dispositions required for its reception " (1996: 75) . Powers are, it appears, the only aspects of substantial forms to which we have access. primitive force makes such a substratum superfluous. Primitive force is itself the unchanging, unifying, underlying entity in which all changing states inhere; it also individuates substances, which is one role attributed to the substratum in some Scholastic theories.
Let me just mention one final aspect of primitive active force, namely, its relation to what Leibniz sometimes calls the 'law of the series.' One might wonder whether this law is a further ingredient in substances and whether it is at least as fundamental as primitive force.
Leibniz discusses the law of the series most extensively in his letters to Burcher de Volder.
Some of his descriptions of that law do indeed make it sound like an additional, fundamental ingredient of monads. For instance, here is how he explains the persistence conditions of monads to de Volder:
The substance that succeeds is taken to be the same as long as the same law of the series, i.e., of the continual simple transition, persists that gives rise to our belief in the same subject of change, i.e., the monad. I say that the fact that there is a certain persisting law, which involves the future states of that which we conceive of as the 52 In a letter to de Volder, Leibniz says that his substantial forms are "the sources of action and unity" (June 20, 1703, LDV 257) . This is a further parallel with Aristotelian substantial forms: according to Des Chene, medieval Aristotelians typically understand substantial forms as the "ground of the unity of active powers" (1996: 179); demonstrations of the existence of substantial forms were typically based on "the necessity of a unifying ground" of powers whose effects we observe (1996: 158 54 See also 'On Nature Itself,' where Leibniz talks of an enduring and "inherent law" in all substances "from which both actions and passions follow" (ONI 5).
Here, the law of the series plays one of the roles that I have so far attributed to primitive force: it is a persisting, unchanging entity that accounts for the identity of substances over time. In fact, Leibniz tells de Volder earlier in the same letter that "nothing is permanent in
[substances] except the very law that involves the continued succession" (LDV 289). In a prior letter, Leibniz even says to de Volder that the nature of the soul "consists in a certain perpetual law of the same series of change, which it runs through unhindered step by step"
(April 3, 1699, LDV 75). Moreover, Leibniz claims in a reply to Pierre Bayle that "this law of order … constitutes the individuality of each particular substance" (G 4:518/PT 203).
According to these passages, the law of the series sounds like an excellent candidate for a fundamental entity. Indeed, it threatens to usurp many of the roles that I have so far ascribed to primitive force. What, then, is the relationship between the law of the series and primitive force?
Leibniz's answer is a simple one: the law of the series just is the primitive force. Moreover, in 'On Nature Itself' he argues for the existence of "a soul or a form analogous to a soul, or a first entelechy, that is, a certain urge [nisus] or primitive force of acting, which itself is an inherent law, impressed by divine decree" (ONI 12; similarly in ONI 6).
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According to these passages, the "law" that Leibniz occasionally invokes is just another name for the primitive force (or vice versa). Sometimes Leibniz appears to find it helpful to describe the fundamental nature of substances as force-like; at other times, he appears to find it helpful to describe it as law-like. This should not be surprising: one important aspect of Leibnizian primitive force is that it makes it possible in principle to predict the entire series of changes that will occur in a monad. Changing states arise from the primitive force in a deterministic, lawful fashion. Talking about a law of the series is a helpful way to emphasize this aspect of primitive force. Yet, that is not the only central aspect of primitive force: its active nature is at least as important, and that aspect is not captured very well by calling it a law. Hence, 'primitive force' is the more accurate label for the entities at the fundamental level.
DERIVATIVE ACTIVE FORCE
What I have said so far allows us already to make sense of some of the ways in which Leibniz talks about monads. He identifies them with primitive forces because they are, at bottom, forces. Likewise, he calls primitive active forces 'substantial forms' because they do the work that Scholastic writers assigned to substantial forms: they specify the activities that are characteristic of a substance and endow the substance with powers to perform those activities. Primitive forces also serve as the principles of the substance's synchronic and diachronic identity.
My next task in this paper is to explore the status of derivative active forces. The results of this exploration will enable us, in the final section, to reconcile the claim that monads are fundamentally forces with one additional way in which Leibniz often describes monads: as perceivers with appetitions. The first thing to note-which I already mentioned briefly when discussing derivative passive force-is that derivative forces change, while primitive forces do not. Leibniz writes to de Volder that unlike primitive forces, derivative forces are "continually found to be one way and then another" (June 20, 1703, LDV 263). That is one important difference between primitive and derivative force.
In fact, in several passages Leibniz argues from the observation that derivative forces change to the existence of an underlying, unchanging primitive force. In yet another letter to de Volder, Leibniz says that " [u] nless there is something in us that is primitive and active,
there cannot be derivative forces and actions in us" (June 30, 1704, LDV 307). 57 Changeable forces, he insists, require some underlying unchanging force-that is, they require primitive force. The reason that Leibniz typically cites for this is the following: "everything accidental,
i.e., mutable, must be a modification of something essential, i.e., perpetual" (ibid.). Or, as he puts it elsewhere, derivative force must be "something modal, since it admits of change. But every mode consists of a certain modification of something that persists, that is, of 57 See also an earlier letter to de Volder: "corporeal substances cannot be constituted from derivative forces alone joined with resistance, i.e., from vanishing modifications. Every modification presupposes something lasting" (June 20, 1703, LDV 263 derivative force is a limitation of primitive force just as shape is a limitation of extension.
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What precisely are derivative forces, then? Saying that they are limitations of some unchanging, underlying force-that is, of primitive force-is somewhat helpful but needs to be spelled out further. The analogy with shape might suggest that derivative force is a limited portion or proper part of primitive force. Yet, that cannot be entirely correct-primitive force is supposed to be mereologically simple. But perhaps something in the vicinity is true.
Consider the following passage from a letter to de Volder:
derivative force is the present state itself insofar as it tends toward a following state, i.e., preinvolves a following state. … But the persisting thing itself, insofar as it involves [involvit] all cases, has primitive force, so that primitive force is like the law of a series, and derivative force is like a determination that designates some term in the series. (January 21, 1704, LDV 287) In this context, thinking of primitive force as law-like is helpful: primitive force is the ultimate ground of the entire series of changing states and makes it possible, in principle, to predict all changes that will happen in the substance. It "involves all cases." The primitive force is like a law or function that dictates (and even generates) the entire series of states. Now consider a substance at some particular time. The substance's primitive force specifies not only the state in which the substance is at that time but also the states to which it is about to transition. Some aspect of its primitive force determines it to change in a particular way at that particular time. This aspect or determinate tendency, Leibniz appears to be saying, 58 If he is endorsing the more general principle that active entities cannot inhere in something that lacks activity, it is an additional reason for him to deny that there is a substratum that is not force-like. For Leibniz, after all, the substratum or subject of change which persists through changes must itself be a type of force. 
APPETITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS
Now that we have a better understanding of what derivative forces are and how they relate to primitive forces, let us investigate why Leibniz so often describes monads as mindlike substances that possess appetitions and perceptions. For Leibniz, perceptions are 61 The status of time in Leibniz is controversial; see e.g. Whipple 2010, and Futch 2008: 160ff ., who argue that monads are, at the most fundamental level, atemporal.
representations of external things and appetitions are tendencies to change those representations. He insists repeatedly that these are the only types of internal modifications in monads; sometimes he even says that "the nature of a simple substance consists of perception and appetite" ('Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason' §8, C 14/MP 175). He also maintains that monadic perceptions change constantly, expressing everything that happens in the external world. Can we reconcile this description of monads with a force ontology-that is, can we translate Leibniz's talk of appetitions and perceptions into talk of forces?
The relation between appetitions and forces is more straightforward than the relation between perceptions and forces. Hence, let us start with the former. Leibniz defines appetitions as a monad's "tendencies to go from one perception to another" (PNG 2), or as the "action of the internal principle which brings about the change or passage from one perception to another" (M 15). 62 In one way or another, then, appetitions are supposed to help explain the changes in monadic perceptions. When a soul goes naturally from pleasure to pain, for instance, this change can be explained-at least in part-by the appetitions of that soul. This of course makes sense, given that Leibniz denies the interaction of finite substances: any natural change in a monad arises from its own depth. Most plausibly, this means that all changes in a monad are explained by the forces that the monad possesses or to which it is identical.
It is worthwhile to pause here and note the terminology Leibniz employs to refer to appetitions. He often uses the terms 'appetite' (Latin: appetitus; French: appetit) or 'appetition' (Latin: appetitio; French: appetition), apparently interchangeably (' Table of definitions,' C 472).
At other times, he reserves the term 'appetition' for imperfect, unconscious inclinations and contrasts it with 'volition' (NE 173; cf. NE 189, 194 ; revision note, A 6.1.286/L 92n18).
Leibniz also uses other terms to refer to or describe appetitions, namely, the French and Latin counterparts of the terms 'tendency' (letter to Wolff, GLW 56; letter to Remond, G 3:622; letter to Bourguet, G 3:575/L 662f.), 'inclination' (reply to Bayle, G 4:550/WF 105; Gr 480/SLT 97; CD 138; NE 351), and 'desire' (NE 192; 'Definitions, ' A 6.4.310; Beeley 11) , as well as the French term effort (NE 173, 192) and the Latin terms conatus (' Table of definitions,' C 491) and percepturitio (letter to Wolff, GLW 56). Some of these terms are useful 62 In another text, Leibniz defines 'appetite' as "the endeavour of acting tending towards new perception" (G 7:330/SLT 66); similarly in a letter to Bourguet, August 5, 1715, G 3:581/L 664. for understanding what precisely appetitions are and how they relate to forces. In particular, the terms 'tendency,' 'inclination,' 'effort,' and 'conatus' are useful because they strongly suggest that appetitions are forces of some kind.
What might be the relationship between appetitions and primitive forces? Because appetitions appear to be forces, one possibility is that a monad's appetitions are identical to the primitive force that constitutes the monad's nature. 63 If that is correct, a monad at bottom simply is the collection of all of its simultaneous inclinations to transition to new perceptions. That would make at least some sense, because Leibniz claims that a monad's appetitions, like its fundamental nature, explain the changes that happen in that substance.
Yet, it turns out that the relation between appetitions and primitive force cannot be straightforward identity; it is more complicated than that. There are indications that Leibniz takes perceptions to be grounded in forces-as he must, if he is indeed a force ontologist. In 'New System of Nature,' for instance, he claims that the nature of substantial forms "consists in force, and that from this there follows something analogous to sensation and appetite" (G 4:478f./AG 139). Entities that are analogous to sensations-that is, perceptions-are here described as following from the force that constitutes the nature of substantial forms. This text does not explain how exactly perceptions follow from force. Yet, here is one possibility, based on what we have learned 66 One text that at least initially seems to suggest otherwise is a letter to de Volder, probably from January 1705: "I relegate derivative forces to the phenomena, but I think that it is clear that primitive forces can be nothing other than the internal strivings of simple substances, by which they pass from perception to perception by a certain law of their nature" (LDV 319). Here it does sound as if appetitions themselves are primitive forces rather than derivative ones. Yet, I do not think that this can be what Leibniz means. Perhaps when he is saying that monads pass from perception to perception by primitive forces, he does not mean to say that the primitive forces do this immediately, but rather that they do so through their modifications, that is, through derivative forces or appetitions. 67 Rutherford 2005 : 165, Adams 1994 : 380, and Kulstad 1990 This passage indicates that the complexity of a monad's tendency is somehow identical to the monad's perceptions: the text appears to identify the "multitude of present thoughts"
with the "composite tendency." (The term 'thought' is clearly used as a synonym for 'perception' in this text.) Hence, Leibniz appears to suggest that perceptions are themselves tendencies.
But how could perceptions be tendencies? One way to understand the passage from the reply to Bayle is the following. Recall that for Leibniz, perceptions are ultimately nothing but the variety in a simple thing that has a particular kind of correspondence-something like an isomorphism-to variety outside of the simple thing. 69 The passage from Leibniz's reply to Jorgensen 2015 , Swoyer 1995 : 84f., Kulstad 1977 : 73f., 2006 . tendency or force. 70 If that is correct, the perception of a monad at some time just is the structure or complexity of its derivative force at that time. This structure constantly changes, always representing the present state of the external world. Because derivative force is an aspect of primitive force, this would mean that perceptions are ultimately aspects of primitive force as well.
If this interpretation is correct, appetitions and perceptions are not identical to each other. Rather, they are two different modifications of primitive force, or two different ways in which the primitive force presents itself. Saying that a monad at time t possesses an appetite for x would simply mean that the primitive force presents itself at t as striving toward x. In other words, the tendency toward x, which is an aspect of the monad's primitive force, is manifesting at t. Similarly, saying that at time t the monad perceives y simply means that the primitive force presents itself at t as structured in such a way that it represents y. In other words, the aspects of the primitive force that are manifesting at t are structured in a way that mirrors the structure of y. The structure of the derivative force, in virtue of which it represents y, is not identical to the derivative force in its entirety. Hence, perceptions are not identical to appetitions.
This interpretation is intriguing, but it raises a number of questions that would need to be addressed in order to assess its viability. Most importantly, we would need to explain in what precisely the manifestation of a force consists. To what do forces lead when they manifest-more forces, which are structured in such a way that they represent the external world? That sounds odd, but perhaps it is coherent; perhaps it is even what Leibniz had in mind. Yet, I currently find the other interpretation more appealing, on which perceptions are not force-like even though they are grounded in forces. Perceptions are the states toward which derivative forces tend-that is, the states that result from derivative forces when they manifest.
CONCLUSION
I have not answered nearly all of the important questions about Leibnizian forces in this
paper. Yet, I provided a rough account of some intriguing features of these forces that interpreters have largely neglected. First of all, Leibnizian forces pass into action, or manifest, without needing a stimulus. Second, forces are fundamental; they are the sole inhabitants of the ground floor of Leibniz's mature ontology. Monads do not have forces, strictly speaking-they are forces. At the most fundamental level, we find primitive forces, and each unified and simple primitive force is a monad. Moreover, primitive passive force is not a genuine constituent of substances but a mere privation or limitation. When Leibniz ascribes primitive passive force to a monad, he is merely referring to the limitation in the monad's primitive active force. Finally, derivative forces are the changing modifications of primitive force; they are aspects of the primitive force that manifest successively and therefore constitute a series of modifications.
Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences. Among other things, it requires us to reconsider the status of time in Leibniz's system and to revise our understanding of appetitions and perceptions. While I was not able to explore those consequences fully, I sketched an interpretation on which it makes sense to talk of the changing modifications of an unchanging, primitive force. Likewise, I proposed to understand appetitions and perceptions as grounded in primitive force. Appetitions are derivative active forces-that is, they are tendencies toward a particular change; they are the aspects of primitive force that manifest at a particular time. In contrast, perceptions are the states toward which these derivative forces tend and to which the derivative forces lead when they manifest. Hence, we can translate Leibniz's talk about appetitions and perceptions into his talk about forces. That also enables us to understand why Leibniz sometimes finds it useful to describe monads as mind-like substances that perceive and strive: monads are indeed mind-like insofar as they are forces that produce representations of the external world and tend toward new representations. Because these forces also play many of the roles that Scholastic substantial forms were supposed to play, it furthermore makes sense for Leibniz to describe his ontology in hylomorphic terms. Each of Leibniz's three descriptions of monads-as mind-like substances, as hylomorphic compounds, and as forces-is helpful in its own way, even though the last one captures the fundamental nature of monads the best. 
